by Ethan McMonagle

Much of aesthetic theory has devoted itself to the question of 'what is art,' or 'how can art be classed against that which is non-art?' Philosophers have offered responses to both questions to varying degrees of plausibility. Perhaps against a strict definition like 'x is art iff...' with necessary and sufficient conditions, a more feasible manner to answer the first question is to answer the second. In separating art from non-art, it might be possible to define art, with nonnecessary and nonsufficient criteria. A less rigid distinction of what constitutes art could be made by creating a general class into which art will fall. Morris Weitz, in his essay The Role of Theory in Aesthetics, aims to accomplish this task with an anti-essentialist stance proclaiming art as indefinable. This open conception of art would allow for the inclusion of innovative and fringe art which would threaten any hard conditionals demanded by more closed conceptions. This rendering is seemingly tenable and certainly compelling, but unfortunately, also meaningless. In this essay, I will survey Weitz's open conception of art and show that deeming art as indefinable is actually stronger than he intends, as it recreates the essentialist conception which succumbs to the very objections that Weitz had tried to subvert. The upshot is a disastrous outcome for the ontology of art, and consequently, metaphysics at large.

To begin, a brief foray into metaphysics is necessary. In an effort to classify objects, we must account for what makes any object what it is. Often this is accomplished by enumerating the essential properties constitutive of that object. An essential property is "...a property which that object has always possessed and which it cannot cease to possess without thereby ceasing to exist" (Lowe, 96). This is normally contrasted against accidental properties of an object which "...an object may possess at some time but which it could have failed to possess (without threatening the identity of the object)..." (Lowe, 97). With essential properties being necessarily constitutive of the identity of their host objects, this is where we should begin to sort objects into particular classes. This is not an easy task for the classification of art however, since aesthetic theory seeking essential features of art has yielded so little unified agreement about those essential properties, if there are any at all. With regard to this, I shall articulate briefly what closed and open conceptions of art then involve.

Closed classificatory concepts hold that the essential features of an object contribute wholly or partially to its inclusion in the class. Weitz specifies that "If necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a concept can be stated, the concept is a closed one...It (a closed concept) cannot occur with empirically-descriptive and normative concepts unless we arbitrarily close them by stipulating the ranges of their uses" (Wartenberg, 193). The class of 'book' illustrates a facile example of an essential feature and closed concept. Books must have pages in order to be admitted in the class, yet specific numbers of pages, or the content contained therein, is purely accidental to their status as books. Those properties could be different without excluding them from membership in the class. Weitz challenges that art has no essential features at all, and closed essentialist conceptions thus fail. They are too strong (Ibid., 192).

Open concepts are much less rigid in their admission requirements. Often, they are quite effective in gathering objects that have disputed commonalities or ambiguous salient features but are still regarded to be in some sort of commerce with one another. A concept "...is open if its conditions of application are emendable and corrigible" (Ibid., 193). The example of an open concept that Weitz states and employs is Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance. In response to the seemingly indefinable category of games, he referred to a family resemblance grouping all games together. This seems plausible given that there is not one essential feature that makes any particular game a game, yet it is commonplace to separate games from non-games in conventional parlance (Ibid., 192). It is difficult to differentiate the import that Weitz places on open concepts and family resemblances. That is, whether the open concept is the base premise to a family resemblance grouping of objects, or whether the family resemblance among objects is the admission requirement to the overarching open concept (Holt, 2003). In this discussion, I focus on the latter, with less emphasis on family resemblances than the open conception itself.

Weitz stipulates that an open conception of what constitutes art is the only viable manner of grouping those objects and entities that are considered to be art, but resist any definitive 'why' qualification of how that is so. Art is indefinable, and despite some commonality between various works, there is not even one single essential property by which to classify it wholesale. Weitz further stipulates that innovative and unconventional art can only be accounted for in an open system which readily admits new members (Ibid., 2003). Therefore, a conception needs to be malleable in response to such innovation, as anything at all rigid will no doubt exclude members that should indeed have status within the classification. He urges that even if it is tempting to allow some sort of closed conception of art, we ought not to impose such limits. A closed conception of art will proscribe any innovation, and consequently, extinguish itself (Wartenberg, 194). This open conception certainly seems tenable, but some important objections must be considered.

The thrust of my polemic against Weitz needs one qualification: I am disappointed that Weitz feels the need to hold on to aesthetic theory. He articulates perfectly the lines that I draw in the coming paragraphs: "Aesthetic theory -- all of it -- is wrong in principle in thinking that a correct theory is possible because it radically misconstrues the logic of the concept of art. Its main contention that "art" is amenable to real or any kind of true definition is false" (Wartenberg, 192). Weitz appears confident of this, yet undermines his idea of an open concept by his own postulation, to wit, his own theory.

Although it seems that Weitz wishes to do away with theory-based classificatory attempts, his open conception is stronger than he intends, and is itself a theoretical classification. M. H. Abrams remarked that all criticism presupposes a theory, and therefore that in Weitz writing about art, there is indeed a theory put forth (Weitz, 73). As such, Weitz's anti-essentialism may not be the anti-theory that he had intended. It is a tangible theory. In an effort to save the proposed transparency of the open conception of art, Weitz rhetorically replies: "...why call these presuppositions a theory if all that is involved is the employment of certain criteria, or even sets of criteria, for talking about art when these criteria are not stated or assumed to be members of any definitive set?" (Ibid, 73). This response admits that Weitz, although offering a theory, isn't really referring to anything at all. Even with some sort of (unqualified) family resemblance among objects within a disparate group, there are no boundaries, and thus the concept could plausibly admit members and non-members alike unless there is a principled manner in which that admission could be regulated. Weitz stipulates no regulating principle. In fact, the concept could plausibly admit so many members such that the concept itself would dissolve and yield no classification at all, not even an indefinable anti-concept. With increased and varied membership that does not attend to any sort of definitive criteria, we are saying nothing about those members vis à vis saying nothing of the class in which they exist. Weitz's theory, his 'nontology,' is meaningless.

There is a second problem contingent upon the open conception as a theory of classification rather than an anti-theory. The open conception is available to all of the essentialist problems that it tries to escape. Easily enough, we ask again what sort of admission criteria are in place to regulate the membership, if there are any, and Weitz will have to respond with an answer that admits of essential properties. The challenge to escape the necessary and sufficient properties has not been avoided at all (Holt, 2003). Critical evaluation of any theory of art, even an anti-theory or metatheory, will always reveal the implicit need for that theory to circle back to the original essentialist position, demanding the essentialist qualifications that Weitz refuses to make. And this refusal brings us back to the first objection, that Weitz's anti-theory is in fact a theory, and is meaningless because it tells us nothing of what art is, or how it should be classified.

Thus, Weitz is filibusting aesthetic theory with his attempt to classify art in an open concept. He is simply calling a vacancy in the contemporary theory an open concept in order to placate the need for a categorization. His indefinable stipulation is itself a definition, another vacancy in the theory. This is further evinced by the lack of a definite complement class to the Weitzian open concept. Since no parameters have been set to justify admission to the open concept of art, then there exists no complement, and therefore no class. This open conception is not a plausible way to parse out art and non- art at all.

I will now make the stronger offer that Weitz refused to. First, we cannot ontologize art. If all of the literature in aesthetic theory thus far has testified anything, it is that there is no unified opinion on what exactly constitutes art or where it may stand in any sort of metaphysical hierarchy. This creates a tension against the fact that art really does seem to exist; we can see it, touch it, create it and destroy it. So here is a final brief attempt at a metaphysical reconciliation. Rather than an appeal to any essential properties of which no perceived token may embody the type, perhaps speaking of art as a universal will help carve out a designation. This is certainly more plausible -- regarding art as a universal to which each particular is an instantiation of. Unfortunately, universals require essential properties, and art has none, so art cannot be a universal. As well, trope theory, with individual instances resembling one another in a family resemblance manner, fails to express anything given that any resemblance still relates to a non-existent universal. Tokens of types, particulars of universals and tropes in relation all require talk of essential properties, which are unilaterally absent in the case of art (Holt, 2003). Even eschewing classificatory gestures as such, I need to qualify that throughout this essay I have insisted upon using the term "art" without attending to the fact that it itself is a designator (albeit, a non-rigid one) that could probably use some explication. Certainly my use of the term, and other writers', is muddy; but I will continue to use it insofar as this discussion is limited to the metaphysical aesthetic classification of the phenomena to which the term "art" refers. "Art," as a term that I employ, is less tiresome than "the apparent phenomena to which the term 'art' is normally applied." I am aware of the inconsistency here; it is unavoidable if we are conducting philosophy of art. So regarding the reconciliation between art and philosophy, there isn't one, and cannot be one, since even speaking of it in a philosophical context is already problematic.

To continue the theme that Weitz advocates but ignores, not only is the metaphysical classification of art a spurious venture, the conceptualization of art is also meaningless. In the absence of essential properties and the presence of disparate accidental properties, art is not really a designator for anything over and above what any given individual qualitatively experiences. Any meaning that art as an entity may admit of is then rendered purely subjective. Art then, as an entity, is conceptually vacant. When we speak of or conceptualize about art as an entity, we are not actually attending to anything more than some perceptible phenomena that is limited to a small community of kindred opinion. Or perhaps that community won't even exist and the conceptualization will be solely the property of the individual agent. A collective conceptualization of art as an entity is meaningless, and when employing it, we are not saying anything more definitive than isolated subjective true- or falsisms related to an instance that we may or may not group within this non-existent category. Therefore, philosophical talk of art is rendered subjective and theory fails to attend to anything more than the theory itself, in spite of the fact that there is no definitive at which its critique takes aim. Aesthetic theory is vacuously self-referential.

I will entertain two objections that may arise against this discussion of mine. First, it may seem ironic that I am not subjecting my own idea of aesthetic philosophy to the same scrutiny as I am Weitz's. If his discussion presupposes a theory, then mine must be a theory as well, and is also vacuous since my theory attends to the absentia that I have criticized Weitz for. This objection does not obtain. This discussion seems to presuppose a theory, but is itself not a theory. It is not even anti-theory, and that will be made apparent with my final point, calling for the end of aesthetic ontological theory, which this discussion signifies for me. The second objection is that by calling for an end to the ontology of art for whatever reasons I may offer, I am not saving the phenomena. The charge, in its simplest form, is that I am cheating; I am refusing to attend to the apparent importance of classifying art against non-art in an effort to elucidate those respective identities. To this, I reply that the apparent need is only the need of aesthetic theory itself, a need that assumes that there is some phenomenon that does indeed need to be saved, but mostly that it can and should be saved vis à vis philosophical scrutiny. I contest that this need will remain unfulfilled, and that my refusal to attend is entirely valid given the forthcoming prescription.

If we can say anything wholesale about art as an entity -- if we can attribute any definitive trait or purpose to art -- it is this: The greatest work of that phenomena which we regard as art, that which may gather it holistically over any other attempted designator, is the fact that it asserts itself as an entity unavailable to philosophical quantification. We cannot predicate any philosophical premise onto art, since by philosophy's own standards we can't even identify the entity to which we refer. Art is metaphysically unenumerable, ontologically vacant. As such, the rigidity of philosophy is displayed insofar as philosophy cannot say anything meaningful about art; by the prescription of metaphysical analysis, no single theory of art can or will ever account for the ultimate nature of art. Metaphysics, at least when it concerns itself with aesthetics, has thus engineered its own failure. Therefore, the sum of my offering is that the aesthetic project must be discarded entirely, as Weitz refused to do.

Perhaps to slake the thirst of any insatiable metaphysicians, I will make a tentative offering: Art, regardless of intent, may be defined solely by the fact that it illustrates that philosophy is bankrupt of meaningful content. Given this, it seems that art and philosophy are mutually exclusive, and they are, such that the entire existence of art has served to obviate any philosophical theory that ventures to range over it. This is art's collective, continuous, unintentional vernissage; a mandate thrust upon it by philosophy. Art as it stands, then, is a major embarrassment for philosophy.

It seems that Albert Camus was correct in his lambaste that "Art does not tolerate Reason" (Camus, 96), since it is quite apparent that Reason cannot tolerate art either.

Works Cited:

Camus, Albert: Youthful Writings. Alfred A. Knopf Inc., New York, N.Y., 1976.

Holt, Jason: Philosophy 339/2, Class lectures. Concordia University, Montréal, QC, autumn, 2003.

Lowe, E. J.: A Survey of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press, New York, N.Y., 2002.

Wartenberg, Thomas E. ed.: The Nature of Art -- An Anthology. Selections from Morris Weitz, The Role of Theory in Aesthetics. Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, Belmont CA, 2002.

Weitz, Morris: The Opening Mind -- A Philosophic Study of Humanistic Concepts. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago Il, 1977.